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NOTE
Recognizing America’s “Religious Nones” and
Their Influence on Political and Legal Norms
Samuel Seeds*
“The relationship between the state and organized religion in civil democratic
societies is inherently complicated. There is inevitable tension between state organs
and religious institutions.” 1

INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Note is two-fold. First and foremost, this Note was written
to develop the conversation concerning the rise of the Religious Nones2 in the United
States, as there is very little thought or recognition given to Nones in legal academia.
The majority of scholarship only gives a paragraph or two on the subject of Nones,
despite the fact that Nones have been growing since the 1990s.3 Second, this Note
was written to shed light on the direct impact that Religious Nones are having on
American society, specifically the link between the rise of the Nones and the gradual
excising of politics and laws attributed to religious moral tradition.
However, it is also important to define what this Note is not. This Note does
not enter the conversation concerning whether religious liberties are in danger; 4
rather, this Note suggests that the legal norms that receive support based solely upon
religious and faith-based grounds are going to be challenged for their lack of
secularity and, conversely, presence of religious motivation.
This Note also suggests that the rise of the Moral Majority, or Religious Right,
has impressed religious fundamentalism onto American legal doctrine and political
platforms, and will, therefore, be challenged by the Nones in future political and legal
arenas. It is not the case that America will no longer possess the status of a pluralist
*
1
2

3

4

J.D. Candidate 2018, Indiana University, Maurer School of Law
AMOS N. GUIORA, FREEDOM FROM RELIGION: RIGHTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY 94 (2d ed. 2013).
The nomenclature of the Religious Nones arises from shorthand “to refer to people who self-identify as
atheists or agnostics as well as those who say their religion is ‘nothing in particular.’” See Michael
Lipka, A Closer Look at America’s Rapidly Growing Religious ‘Nones’, PEW RESEARCH CENTER: FACT
TANK (May 13, 2015).
See infra text accompanying note 88. It should be stated that this Note is not picking up the discussion
concerning the tension between true nonbelievers, such as Atheists or Agnostics, and the public
recognition and tolerance of Christian influence. Such discussion can be seen in the work of Caroline
Mala Corbin and Nelson Tebbe. See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Nonbelievers and Government
Speech, 97 IOWA L. REV. 347 (2012); Nelson Tebbe, Nonbelievers, 97 VA. L. REV. 1111 (2011).
See generally Daniel O. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology to
Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1 (2000) (arguing that the anticipated and
furthered support of formal neutrality with regard to the treatment of religion, as opposed to special
treatment, may have detrimental effects on religious liberties).
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nation, nor is it the case that the increasing None population will threaten the
continuance of religious freedom. What is changing is the public’s tolerance for basing
legal norms on religious moral tradition.
In Part I of this Note, I examine a brief, but certainly not exhaustive, overview
of how America’s religious freedom is derived from the early notion of “tolerance,” the
debate surrounding the definitional problem of whether America is a “Christian” or
“Secular” nation and how a compromise of “soft” secularism might be a viable
alternative. This portion of the Note is designed to lay a foundation for the early
entanglement of Church and State in America, to show the debate that gave rise to
the Religious Right, and to show how the seldom-discussed alternative of soft
secularism—if deemed to be the true category of American socio-political religiosity—
is what Nones prefer because of the acceptance of individual religion coupled with
political secularism. Part II of this Note is devoted to explaining who the Nones are,
from basic demographics to their origins as a social counter-movement to the
Religious Right, and what the Nones generally “believe,” for lack of a better word.
Finally, Part III is devoted to explaining the impact that Nones have already had in
the political and legal worlds and to hazard a prediction at what portions of law they
may influence next.
It is my hope that centering a dialogue around Nones as a causative factor will
shed light on changes that America’s political and legal realms have seen in the past
few years.
I.

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, PLURALISM, AND “SOFT” SECULARISM IN AMERICA

The United States of America is lauded as a nation with a history of religious
freedom codified by the Constitution. Religious liberty has always been ardently
protected. However, when it comes to the discussion of whether America is a
“Christian” or a “Secular” nation, the conversation could not be more divisive. 5
A.

America’s Evolution From Toleration to Religious Liberty.

A young, colonial America would stutter and start when newly freed from the
religious subjugation of the English Theocratic Monarchy but would eventually find
its way to forging true religious liberty and, in fact, encouraging the exploration,
understanding, or indifference of the religions of others.6
After being religiously oppressed by the Crown and having made their
pilgrimage to America, it was in the early eighteenth century that American
“dissenting groups,” or those who did not subscribe to state-sponsored church, were
5
6

See generally John Fea & Jacques Berlinerblau, America: A Christian Nation or a Secular Nation?, in
SECULARISM ON THE EDGE: RETHINKING CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, AND
ISRAEL (Jacques Berlinerblau, Sarah Fainberg, & Aurora Nou eds., 2014).
See CHRISTOPHER J. BENEKE, BEYOND TOLERATION: THE RELIGIOUS ORIGINS OF AMERICAN PLURALISM 6
(2006).
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given “the right to worship privately and to direct their tax payments toward the
support of their own ministers.” 7 This became known as “toleration” and gave a minor
reprieve to minority religious groups8 concerning financial burdens and criminal
punishments, but still required either a formal petition or state certification to preach
dissenting doctrine.9 However, as the American Revolution neared, many groups
sought greater religious equality.10
The demands of the insular groups were heard, and religious integration began
moving America toward interdenominational agreement and cooperation.11
Beginning just prior to the American Revolution, approximately the 1760s, and
continuing through the 1780s, greater religious liberty began to form among the
American colonies, as “state governments either could not or would not maintain the
discriminatory policies that continued to characterize European societies.” 12
Discourse surrounding religious ideology switched from the biased and “thinly-veiled
disdain” under toleration and became “more egalitarian” towards religious
differences.13 The first notion of similar treatment across some religious lines was
officially codified on December 15, 1791, when the First Amendment was ratified as
a part of the Bill of Rights.14
Shortly after the First Amendment’s ratification, American society began to
move toward true pluralism with a serious openness and willingness to have
conversations about “encouraging cooperative endeavors between different religious
groups.”15 Christopher Beneke posits that the existence of mutual respect (even if
given “begrudgingly” or “insincerely”) created the foundation for a presumption of
equal worth to alternative religious ideals—“[A]s people acquired greater freedom to
define their own religious experiences, their liberty to criticize other people’s
diminished[, a] pluralistic society required nothing less.” 16 Although religious liberty
came into America “unevenly,” it demanded reciprocity, recognition, and for each
religious group to possess the right to full public expression and all modes of
worship.17

7
8
9
10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Id. at 5–6.
At this point in time, essentially all recognized religious factions were Christian denominations, for
example, Catholics, Anglicans, Baptists, and other protestant denominations.
See BENEKE, supra note 6.
See Id. at 11–12, 114. Other, non-Christian religious groups, including West African and Native
American religions, only had traces persist beyond the eighteenth century, and other religions, such as
Judaism, Buddhism, and Hinduism, would suffer resistance until the nineteenth or twentieth
centuries. Id. at 11–12.
See id. at 81, 88.
Id. at 6.
See id.
U.S. CONST. amend. I. It should be noted, however, that much of the Protestant, colonial United States
was extremely anti-Catholic, even suggesting that Catholicism is “adverse to liberty.” LYMAN BEECHER,
PLEA FOR THE WEST 61 (1835).
See BENEKE, supra note 6, at 6–7.
Id. at 9–10.
See id. at 114–115.
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Though it would be incorrect to state that America has maintained perfect
equality through religious pluralism up through the twenty-first century,18 it is clear
that “because Americans have generally proved so ready to conceive of themselves as
both ecumenical servants of the republic and devotees of particular churches, they
have been able to make religious pluralism central to their national identity.” 19 This
means that, despite occasional conflict, Americans have recently come to see the
United States as a pluralistic society, ready to accept new religions (or lack thereof)
as being valuable perspectives.20
In this modern America, it would appear that the same principles are upheld
through what is known as the ongoing notion of “spiritual cosmopolitanism,” or “a
religious interests in religious others.” 21 Modern youth, Matthew Hedstrom states,
have adopted what was originally the basis for toleration—which also became the
basis for acceptance of diverse forms of Christianity, and the eventual acceptance of
non-Christian religions—and recognize that many religious perspectives are
valuable, that many religions may contain Truth, and that one may adopt and
practice more than one of these religions. 22
Contemporary American religious diversity is described by Stephen J. Stein,
who provides a comprehensive explanation of the evolution of American religion,
specifically referring to an “accelerating growth of religious diversity,” where the
scope of religious diversity in America is greater than ever. 23 According to Stein, no
longer will one be able to rely on denominational descriptors to accurately describe
political stance, so further stipulations of “religious liberal” or religious conservative
will be necessary for such issues as abortion, homosexual rights, and family values.24
Further, the terms “religion” and “spiritual” have become convoluted, and
monotheism, specifically the Judeo-Christian tradition, is no longer seen as the beall and end-all of social morality.25 Simply put, American religious diversity has

18

19
20

21
22
23
24
25

Repeatedly throughout history, American society has looked poorly upon specific religions, despite its
claim of continued religious freedom. For example, consider the strife of Catholic or Jewish
communities through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in America and Muslim practitioners
since the rise of terror attacks or the radicalized Islamic State. See discussion in footnotes 10 and 14,
supra.
BENEKE, supra note 6, at 221–222.
But see Conkle, supra note 4, at 4–5. It must be stated that, until recently, Protestant Christianity, to
the exclusion of all other religions and Christian sects, held primacy both in social and political arenas
in American history; it “informed and refined the American understanding of religious liberty” and
completely “permeated American life.” Id. See also, discussion associated with footnote 36.
Matthew S. Hedstrom, Rise of the Nones, in FAITH IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE FUTURE OF RELIGION
AND AMERICAN POLITICS 260 (Matthew Avery Sutton & Darren Dochuk eds. 2016).
See id. at 261.
See Stephen J. Stein, Religion/Religions in the United States: Changing Perspectives and Prospects, 75
IND. L.J. 37, 41–49 (2000).
See id. at 57–58.
See id. at 58–59; see also Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Uncivil Religion: JudeoChristianity and the Ten Commandments, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 275, 284 (2007) (“Judeo-Christianity can
no longer plausibly claim to capture the beliefs of nearly all Americans.”).
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grown to a level of complexity not previously seen, effectively challenging
denominational terms and even the fundamental descriptor of “religious.” 26
B.

So, is America “Christian” or “Secular”?

The argument about whether America is a “Christian Nation” or a “Secular
Nation” may feel like an age-old conflict, but this question only arose in the 1960s
and 1970s, in large part because the “Christian Right” and the “Moral Majority”
became politically active.27 In order to mete out the question of “Christian” or
“Secular,” it is import to first recognize the inherent problems with using the word
“secular” (used in its truest sense “secular” refers to political secularism without
implicating personal religion) and second, recognize that religion has only recently
become a tool in political leveraging by the political right.
Since the founding and independence of the United States, the adoption of a
state-sponsored religion has been staved off by adopting, instead, what is known as
America’s “civil religion.” Although based upon the principles of virtue informed by
Protestant Christianity, Christianity was never expressly adopted by the State. Early
in American history, religious groups, after being given equality through the religious
integration movements, began to exert influence on politics as coalitions. 28 In
response to the fear of a state-sponsored religion, political leaders such as James
Madison calmed the nerves of the colonists, who remembered religious faction
violence by stating that the groups would not be competing for state power, but would
act as a mutual check on one another. 29 However, religious political leaders continued
to invoke the necessity of belief in a higher being to ensure civil stability, regardless
of the nature of the belief or from which denomination the belief arose. 30
Therefore, as a compromise, after the American Revolution, it was deemed
important to refer to America as “religious,” without further specification, and only
through general monotheistic means, as any further defining of the religion
(Christian, Protestant, Calvanist, etc.) would “fray the bonds of union” between the
religious factions. This is based on the “nineteenth-century conviction that religion,
in and of itself, preserves order,” and “[w]ithout religion, there would be no morality,
no honesty, and no trust.”31
Around the same time period, a portion of mainstream Christianity was
challenged for its exclusiveness, where the narrow-mindedness of those who despised
26
27
28

29
30
31

See generally Courtney Miller, “Spiritual but not Religious”: Rethinking the Legal Definition of
Religion, 102 VA. L. REV. 833 (2016) (displaying the complexity of trying to provide a modern definition
of “religion”).
See Fea & Berlinerblau, supra note 5, at 19–20.
See BENEKE, supra note 6, at 91 (explaining that during assembly election in Pennsylvania in 1764,
Quakers, Herrnhuters, Mennonites, and Schwenkfelders formed one party, while English of the High
Church, Presbyterians, German Lutherans, and the German Reformed formed a second party–creating
coalitions across religious lines that were previously unheard of). Further, other religious groups, such
as Presbyterians and Anglicans, had been involved with politics since the 1740s. Id. at 93.
See id. at 91.
See id. at 160.
Id. at 159–160.
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non-Christian sects, such as the Deists and Universalists, eventually became socially
unpopular when measured against the open-mindedness of considering an issue from
multiple perspectives (or denominations). This new, socially popular, and accepting
mindset led to the late eighteenth-century culture of indifference to the religions of
others, creating the semblance of social acceptance amongst religious factions.32 The
American population seemed to adopt a “‘civil religion,’ encompassing a commitment
to private worship and the enactment of God’s will through nonsectarian public
policies,” that advanced a “scheme of national religious government that would have
advanced shared moral principles, while leaving each group ‘sovereign’ in its
particular beliefs.”33 What resulted was that explicit religious doctrine moved to the
background; it became far more important to Americans that they shared
fundamental political principles with their neighbor, resulting in a “preference for
piety of theology,” and a “disdain for restrictive creed.” 34
America held this “civil religion” to be near and dear, and although it is clear
that it was not based in a specified religious sect, it was largely informed by the
Protestant Christian tradition.35 In early United States history, eight of every ten
Americans attended some form of religious service, 36 so when it came to defining the
country’s values, many found common and agreeable ground upon which to build the
nation in fundamental, but generally applicable, religious values. According to
Vetterli and Bryner, “The Bible was the primary source of the idea of virtue. . . .
[P]ublic virtue was the application of [Christian] principles by a Christian people to
the society in which they lived.” 37 This virtue, the underlying current of the civil
religion, was informed by Puritanical ideals of morality and religion, and it was held
that private, religious virtue should precede and inform public virtue, meaning that
although the civil religion was not named as Christian, it was built upon the
pervasive Christian tradition in America. 38 In fact, the omnipresence of Christianity
is likely why the status of the nation as Christian or secular was never questioned—
there simply was not a large enough population to make such a challenge. The
Supreme Court remarked on this omnipresence, going as far as to state that that “this
is a Christian nation” because of such prevalence of Christianity. 39
Notably, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, among others, stood stalwart
for the adoption of express, non-denominational Christian principles into
government. Madison’s reasoning was strongly stated in his “Memorial and
Remonstrance,” where he asked, “Who, . . . does not see that the same authority which
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

See id. at 169–171.
Id. at 159–160.
See id. 164–180.
RICHARD VETTERLI & GARY BRYNER, IN SEARCH OF THE REPUBLIC: PUBLIC VIRTUE AND THE ROOTS OF
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 47 (1996).
See BENEKE, supra note 6, at 8.
See VETTERLI & BRYNER, supra note 35, at 50–51.
Id. at 58–59.
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892) (noting that the presence of the
appeals to the Almighty in oaths of office, the use of legislative prayer at all governmental levels, the
laws that observe the Sabbath, and presence of public Christian organizations all indicate the
overwhelming prevalence of Christianity in the United States).
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can establish Christianity in exclusion of all other religions may establish with the
same ease any particular sect?”40 Jefferson, in his Letter to the Danbury Baptist,
stated that “religion is a matter which lies solely between Man & his God, . . . [and]
that the legitimate power of government reach actions only, not opinions.” 41 Jefferson
further remarked on the First Amendment stating that it “build[s] a wall of
separation between Church & State.”42 This line of thought led to the fundamental
notion that “the essence of civil society is the primacy of civil law rather than religious
law,” and that “civil society cannot endure if religious law is supreme to state law.” 43
Those who argue that America is a secular nation posit that the leading
arguments for America being a “Christian Nation” rely upon the supposed original
intent of the Constitution, 44 but ignore other important documents that suggest or
state otherwise.45 For one example, the Declaration of Independence may refer to
inalienable rights derived from natural law and God, but there is a distinct absence
of any statement declaring that America is a Christian nation. 46 Incredibly, one can
look to contradicting documents that state both that America is a stated secular
nation (Treaty of Tripoli) and, simultaneously, that it will promote religion
(Northwest Ordinance).47
With the foregoing in mind, it is clear that it is difficult to provide a blanket
conclusion as to the “religiosity” of America. On the one hand, Framers such as James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson suggested that America was to avoid the
establishment of religion or blending of church and state, but, on the other hand,
Protestant Christianity “[was] intrinsically connected to the political culture of the
new nation” because of the pervasiveness and predominance of the sect in Colonial
American culture and how the sect informed the principles of virtue upon which the
“civil religion” was based.48
C.

A Promising Compromise: The Argument for Soft Secularism in
America.

Amidst the confusion associated with determining whether America is
Christian or Secular is the definitional issue of what “secular” means in this context.
Charles Taylor defines secularism as “[a] move from a society where belief in God is
unchallenged and indeed unproblematic to one in which it is understood to be one

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

BENEKE, supra note 6, at 164.
Library of Congress, Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists, INFORMATION BULLETIN (last visited
Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html.
Id.
GUIORA, supra note 1, at 15.
See Fea & Berlinerblau, supra note 5, at 20–22, (arguing that the Constitution is facially silent on the
matter, so to use the document would require implicating the original meaning and intention of the
Framers).
See id. at 20.
See id. at 20–21.
See id. at 23–25.
See Conkle, supra note 4, at 3–4.
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option among others, and frequently not the easiest to embrace.” 49 Jacques
Berlinerblau defines secularism as “[a] political philosophy which . . . is preoccupied
with, and often deeply suspicious of, any and all relations between government and
religion.” 50 And, finally, defining secularism in the legal arena seems to be credited
to Justice Black’s opinion in Everson v. Board of Education in 1947 when he stated
that there exists a “wall of separation” between church and state that is “high and
impregnable,” despite the fact that, prior to 1947, that could not be quite true (e.g.,
Congress’s allowance of military chaplains, legislative prayer, etc.).51 None of these
definitions recognize the complexity of American religion and politics as separate
entities rather each one “creates a false dichotomy” of American origins as either a
nation of Christians or a nation of atheists. 52
Phil Zuckerman defines something secular as nonbelief, either intentional or
unintentional, but defines secularism as an “ideology, political movement, social
movement” that possesses a particular agenda toward actively changing society. 53 By
making this distinction, Zuckerman accounts for the fact that one may be individually
religious while being politically secular. This notion is filled out by Barry Kosmin
when he defines secular revolution as being either “hard” or “soft,” where “hard” is
seen as a movement toward state atheism and “soft” is a movement toward state
pluralism.54 The latter best represents the colonial “‘liberal’ revolution that tend[ed]
to produce a more moderate, constitutional ‘soft secularism’” that was “characterized
by indifference or neutrality toward religion or encouragement of religious
pluralism.”55 Soft secularism, Kosmin states, is most apparent in states where there
is deep “respect for ‘the past’ and the ‘national heritage.’” 56 Soft secularism is a
political philosophy that results in depriving religious leaders of political power but
maintaining a benign attitude toward their religious beliefs. This notion has been
consistently backed by religious liberals, the Baptists prior to the 1970s,57 atheists,
and agnostics.58

49
50
51

52
53
54
55
56
57
58

CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 3 (2007).
JACQUES BERLINERBLAU, HOW TO BE SECULAR: A CALL TO ARMS FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM at xvi (2012).
See id. at 22–23; see also Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947), (citing Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (“The whole American people which declared that their
legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between church and State.”)).
See Erika B. Seamon, The Dangers of Conflating Secular People and Secularism: A Response to Fea,
Kosmin, Zuckerman, and Berlinerblau, in SECULARISM ON THE EDGE: RETHINKING CHURCH-STATE
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, AND ISRAEL 74 (2014).
See Phil Zuckerman & Jacques Berlinerblau, Secular America: Nones, Atheists, and the Unaffiliated, in
SECULARISM ON THE EDGE: RETHINKING CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, AND
ISRAEL 56 (2014).
See Barry A. Kosmin, The Vitality of Soft Secularism in the United States and the Challenge Posed by
the Growth of the Nones, in SECULARISM ON THE EDGE: RETHINKING CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES, FRANCE, AND ISRAEL 35 (2014).
Id. at 37.
Id.
In the 1970s, Baptists, who had previously backed the premise of soft secularism, joined the Moral
Majority as a response to political and legal decisions, such as Roe v. Wade. See id. at 39.
See id.
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While it may be initially surprising that religious liberals and Baptists
originally supported the premise of soft secularism, it is important to remember that
Americans are “heir[s] to the Protestant heritage of the Reformation, whereby
religious individualism and autonomy predated any concept of political autonomy.”59
This religious individualism harkens back to the initial formulation of toleration and
religious liberty in the eighteenth century when Americans realized that they needed
a secular state and public life as “a neutral playing field” to keep any one religious
sect from controlling in American public policy, despite the pervasiveness of
Protestant Christianity.60 We see this in the “atheological legacy rooted in the liberal
Protestantism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,” as well as Unitarianism
that was championed by Thomas Jefferson and other “Enlightenment rationalists.” 61
While this “soft secularism” or “political secularism” may be construed as the
instatement of atheism as a State policy—whereby atheism is negatively stigmatized
in American society—that generalization would be incorrect. 62 Instead, it is the
notion that governmental, legal, and political leaders can have religious value
backgrounds while maintaining political secularity. 63 Erika Seamon posits that
extreme generalizations are made about both the religious and the secular leaders of
our nation, whereby the religious are assumed to desire the creation of an established
religion—civil or doctrinal—and that the secular are assumed desire acute hostility
or disregard for religion.64 However, conflating an individual’s beliefs as a
presumption on his or her perspective of the relationship with the government is
problematic because it “ignores growing groups of people in America who do not fit
[into either category],” and ignores those who subscribe to the notion of soft or
political secularism.65
It is in this “ignored” space where the Nones fit. They may be religious, they
are certainly political, but neither categorization seems to fit. This is why Seamon
advocates for a position of Interfaith Space, where the views that are highlighted and
recognized are those of the individually and independently faithful, yet pursue
political secularism. Further, associating views of personal faith as inherently locking
in views of separationism is dangerous and limits the necessary conversation
surrounding personal faith and political secularism. 66 Using a system employing
something similar to an Interfaith Space would allow for soft secularism, the removal
59
60
61
62
63

64
65
66

Id.
See id. at 40.
See Hedstrom, supra note 21, at 257.
See Zuckerman & Berlinerblau, supra note 53, at 58–59.
See id. at 65. Zuckerman and Berlinerblau take this notion one step further by challenging the notion
that religion is good for society, and necessary for functioning civil order, effectively dismissing the
premise set by Edmund Burke and Alexis de Tocqueville and reinforced by contemporaries such as
Newt Gingrich, Bill O’Reilly, and Michelle Bachmann. They look at the nations who are most religious
and see they have high murder rates (Colombia, El Salvador, the Philippines), while the secular
nations have some of the lowest murder rates (Japan, Scandinavia). Essentially, they argue that the
notion that religion breeds social order should be rejected. Id. at 59–61.
See Seamon, supra note 52, at 72. Seamon attributes this dichotomy to the rise of the Religious Right
and the Right’s demonizing of the word “secular,” creating a notion of presumptive distrust between the
two camps. See id. at 72–74.
See id. at 74–77.
See id. at 77–78.
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of religiously-integrated political groups, and the development of politically secular
law.
II.

DEFINING AMERICA’S RELIGIOUS NONES

As currently provided by legal scholarship, there is very little offered to
describe and extrapolate on the phenomenon of the increase in the None
demographic. Further, most articles place Nones in the position of bystanders or
symptoms of subtle changes of political and legal religiosity rather than a causative
force. It is important to see this group as the latter, as the Nones stand for a distinct
change in public perception of law based upon religious morals, which may be a
driving force behind the change on legal perspectives seen in anti-sodomy laws, samesex marriage, and abortion, and could have a future impact on such legal issues as
legislative prayer and the presence of military chaplains.
A.

Basic “None” Demographics.

Religious Nones now make up approximately 23% of the United States adult
population, rising from 16% in 2007, and 2.7% in 1957 (see figure below).67 This
increase has occurred in every region of the United States (albeit more aggressively
in geographically secular regions, such as the Northeast and the West Coast), and in
every socioeconomic and racial group. 68 Nones are generally younger, with 35% of
them being Millennials and only 28% accounting for both Baby Boomers and the
Silent Generation.69 Though they register as Independent,70 they vote left,l as the
Democratic Party has taken a majority of the unaffiliated voters in the 2000, 2004,
and 2008 presidential elections—more specifically, Nones vote three-to-one
Democratic on social issues.71

67
68
69
70
71

Lipka, supra note 2; see also Kosmin, supra note 54, at 42.
See Kosmin, supra note 54, at 42.
See Zuckerman & Berlinerblau, supra note 53, at 51–52.
Approximately 49% of Nones were registered Independent in 2008. See Kosmin, supra note 54, at 47.
See Zuckerman & Berlinerblau, supra note 53, at 52; Hedstrom, supra note 21, at 250, 256.
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72

While many of the Nones are former Christians who left their sect for a
multitude of reasons and are now atheist or agnostic in orientation (but not selfdesignation),73 still other Nones are religious, with a large number of Nones falling
into an “Interfaith Space” where individuals are involved in religious, spiritual, and
nonreligious worldviews simultaneously, therefore not fitting into a traditional, onedimensional religious category. 74 As much as 60% of the None population are
members of a religious congregation, while only a minority associate with overtly
secular groups.75 Several Nones, around 11%, were raised without religion, which is
dramatically greater than the 2% of Nones twenty years ago.76
The relationship between higher education and status as a None, or believer,
is unclear—some argue that more education only means less belief in only
fundamentalism, while others argue that education reduces religiosity in general. 77
That being said, the first time a president acknowledged the changed religious
make-up of Americans to include the religiously unaffiliated was in 2009, when
President Obama stated in his inaugural address that the United States is “a nation
of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus, and non-believers.” 78
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Mar. 16, 2015).
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Where Did the Nones Come From?

It would be most accurate to suggest that the Religious Nones arose from a
reaction to the political influence of religiously oriented groups known as the
Christian Right and the Moral Majority.
In the 1960s, “secularism” meant that political actors could be religious, but
their religion could not interfere with their ability to serve the public. However, the
combination of the Supreme Court decisions of Engel v. Vitale,79 School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp,80 and Roe v. Wade,81 as well as the Immigrant Act of
196582 and corruption of the Nixon administration (1972-1974),83 the social and
political conditions were provided to allow for the rise of the Moral Majority and the
Christian Right.84
Prior to this time, the “civil religion” of America “employed biblical rhetoric
and a broad if vague monotheism as a basis for thinking and talking about common
values and national purpose.” 85 However, “when the Religious Right began agitating
against abortion, feminism, and gay rights, liberals began to identify organized
Christianity with conservative politics.” 86 Since the 1970s, the Christian Right has
continued to use politics to advance their own religious doctrine. 87
While the label “spiritual but not religious” may have emerged in the 1990s,
the rise of Religious Nones (who are often associated with the “spiritual but not
religious” label) should be attributed to “a natural reaction to the political activism of
the Religious Right since the 1980s” and specifically to “[t]he politicization of religion
and triumphalism of conservative and evangelical Christians who wish to incorporate
their belief and practice into the polity in recognizable ways has produced a social
and political reaction on the other side.” 88 For example, when the term “JudeoChristianity” was used in 2004 by the Bush campaign to seize the evangelical vote,
the Nones may have perceived “Judeo-Christianity” to no longer signify an inclusive
“civil religion” but a message similar to historical tolerance and justified on a narrow,
sectarian basis.89
Essentially, during the turn of the century, the Nones, disenchanted by the
infusion of religion and politics, began to realize that “[l]eaving organized religion is
79
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a viable religious option for young Americans today because they affirm, with their
liberal religious predecessors, that truth is not exclusive to any one faith tradition,
and certainly not to be found in religion’s creeds or rituals.” 90
C.

What do Nones “Believe”?

Berlinerblau and Fea hold that faith does not belonging in politics and
government, that it is an individual pursuit, and that the religious and the secular
should work together toward common good, stating, “We don’t need to have a
Christian nation in order to live faithfully in the world,” and can still “work together
to make the world a better place.” 91 To this end, Nones “are not strongly antireligious. They’re just relatively indifferent. They just don’t care about religion . . . .
Most of them were raised religious, but they’re no longer religious.”92 In other words,
Nones are living “benignly indifferent to religion in general.” 93
Instead, the Nones are an “affinity group,” a unit that believes the same beliefs
but are not a “cohesive, self-conscious constituency.” 94 This means that they do not
organize or operate as a unit, rather they seem to merely agree on many of the same
issues.95 In fact, Kosmin argues that not only are the Nones merely an “affinity
group,” but that they also lack centralized leadership and proper political branding
and marketing that would allow for the group to unify under a distinct banner. 96
While Nones may be politically secular, believing that “religious background is
less important” in politics, it is also clear that many of them are still shades of
spiritual or religious, with 70% of them believing in God or some sort of higher
power.97 Clearly, “unaffiliated does not mean ‘without religion.’” 98 Many engage in
“free-range faith” where any given None participates in a multitude of religious
tradition, simply not adhering to a singular one, while maintaining a reverence for
Christian Scripture.99 This new “free-range faith” tracks closely with the phenomena
of modernization and individualization of religious beliefs described by Professor
Daniel Conkle.100 In fact, Conkle states that modern “[r]eligious or spiritual believers
90
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holding individualized belief structures . . . tend to reject or distrust traditional
religious theology and doctrines altogether . . . they are likely to reject any distinctive
constitutional or legal protection for religious beliefs or practices as such.” 101
Most succinctly, and with some generalization, Nones believe in the institution
of soft secularism, or “political secularism.” 102 There is a clear distaste for the political
practices of the Religious Right with its notable “religion-infused politics and politicsinfused religion.” 103
With all this in mind, it is clear that, even with the rise of the Nones, we are
not moving toward an atheist, agnostic, or areligious nation. The rise of the None
population is attributed to distaste with organized and politicized Christianity, not
against belief itself. Many will remain affiliated with traditional organized religion,
and many of those who do abandon traditional religion are seeking “to give religion
an even wider berth, to liberate it from its political shackles.” 104 Essentially, the rise
of the Nones is “a massive generational shift toward [religious] re-enchantment.”105
III.

IN POLITICS AND LAW, WHY THE RELIGIOUS NONES MATTER
A.

The Socio-political Impact of the Nones.

Kosmin suggests that if the Nones were able to mobilize under a political
banner or at the voting booths, they would have a considerable political impact.106 To
some extent, it seems as though this prediction is already coming to fruition. As with
the notoriety of the Nones increasing, surveys are being conducted that illustrate a
significant portion of the United States separating the nation from Christianity.
Specifically, as ofJune of 2015, 45% of Americans no longer believe that America is a
Christian Nation.107
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See David E. Campbell, Religious Tolerance in Contemporary America, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 1009, 1018
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340

[6:2

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

108

This public perception is not without political significance either.
Approximately 58% of Americans and 53% of Christians “oppose allowing a small
business owner to refuse products or services to gay and lesbian people, even if doing
so violates their religious beliefs.” 109
This outspokenness and perception of political secularism is not going
unnoticed by the American political elite. Mayor Bill De Blasio is recognized for being
an outspoken None and adherent of political secularism. 110 Further, President
Obama has twice stated that America is no longer a Christian Nation.111 While this
may seem innocuous, it could also be interpreted as a move toward a modern take on
soft secularism, whereby then-President Obama is referring to a generalized civil
religion.
Where “[t]he Religious Right was ostensibly formed to reassert the place of
religion . . . in American society,” there is clearly an ongoing movement to push back
against the religious influence of politics. 112 This push-back and change in perception
of religion and politics has had the effect of limiting the campaigning done from the
pulpit and clergy. While the topics of abortion, same-sex marriage, and contraception
were all at issue in the 2012 election cycle, the Pew Forum on Religious and Public
life reported that, “[W]hile many regular churchgoers say they have been encouraged
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to vote by their clergy, relatively few say church leaders are discussing the candidates
directly or favoring one candidate over the other.” 113
Essentially, we have already begun to see the disentanglement of politics and
religion as motivated socially by the American public. This change in political
representation tracks the social change of an increased population of the None
demographic.
B.

The Present Legal Impact of the Nones.

Throughout contemporary legal history, there has been a subtle shift from
legal adherence to the Judeo-Christian tradition to the secularization of law that does
not deal directly with religious liberty, which closely tracks the political changes from
the evolution of the Religious Right to the advent of the Religious None, though no
such connection was explicitly made. The primary example this Note shall rely on is
the evolution of the Supreme Court’s stance on anti-sodomy laws between Bowers v.
Hardwick and Lawrence v. Texas.
In 1986, somewhat after the Religious Right’s formation in the 1970s, the
Supreme Court found in Bowers v. Hardwick, where the Supreme Court was asked
“whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to
engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make
such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time,” that “notions of morality”
were sufficient justification for sodomy laws. 114 In his concurrence, Justice Burger
specifically stated that the “notions of morality” were “firmly rooted in JudeoChristian moral and ethical standards.” 115 While this majority opinion perhaps
represented the civil religion of the time, Justice Blackmun dissented, stating:
That certain, but by no means all, religious groups
condemn the behavior at issue gives the State no license to
impose their judgments on the entire citizenry. The
legitimacy of secular legislation depends instead on
whether the State can advance some justification for its
law beyond its conformity to religious doctrine.116
Blackmun condemned the choice to parrot a law on the shoulder of tradition when it
blatantly ignored the fact that “the grounds upon which [the original law] was laid
113
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have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the
past.”117 Georgia, in Blackmun’s opinion, needed to “do more than assert that the
choice they have made is an ‘abominable crime not fit to be named among
Christians.’”118
Though the doctrine set under Bowers stood for seventeen years, Justice
Blackmun’s dissent eventually gained traction in Lawrence v. Texas when the
Supreme Court revisited anti-sodomy laws, overruling them as violating the liberty
“touching upon the most private human conduct.” 119 Justice Kennedy’s opinion
acknowledged that “the Court in Bowers was making the broader point that for
centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as
immoral. The condemnation has been shaped by religious beliefs.”120 Ultimately, he
concluded, “Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral
code.”121 Justice O’Connor concurred stating that “[a] law branding one class of
persons as criminal solely based on the State’s moral disapproval of that class and
the conduct associated with that class runs contrary to the values of the Constitution
. . . under any standard of review.”122 The consensus, it seemed, was that justifying a
law solely with traditional Christian morals was not sufficient for the Supreme Court
to uphold laws. Again, this tracks the early recognition of the growing None
population. It was in the 2000s that the None population was recognized as
approximately 15% of the population.123
Though this connection is not technically causal, it would not be prudent to
ignore the fact that the Supreme Court overturned a seventeen-year-old decision
around the same time that the public began to change its collective opinion about
laws motivated by Christian-moral tradition. Furthermore, Nicholas Roberts states
that social opinion can place institutional pressure on a Court to influence its decision
through a specific strategic model.124
The strategic model explains why the Court would be
concerned with self-preservation in the first place. In a
nutshell, this model supposes that judges understand that
“they are constrained in their powers by the operation of
outsiders, which may include the Congress, the President,
the general public, state governments, private interest
groups, attorneys, litigants, or other entities,” and suggests
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that “judges amend their decisions to account for the
preferences of these other actors.” 125
By this logic, the changing landscape of Supreme Court doctrine in the case of antisodomy laws could be attributed to the preferences of the general public at large.
If politicians and clergy are willing to back away from intertwining their
worlds, and the Court is willing to surpass and limit the societal influence of
traditional Christian morals in the realms of anti-sodomy laws and same-sex
marriage, then where else may subtle social influence of the Nones make social,
political, or legal changes?
C.

The Potential Future Impact of the Nones.

It would seem, as of yet, that the sphere of influence that the Nones have had
over the political and legal arenas is limited to instances where individual rights are
concerned (e.g., marriage, private association) or where there is excessive
entanglement between government and religion (e.g., the Religious Right, partisan
political statements made by church leaders)126 We may see, in the coming years, the
influence of the Nones over such matters as legislative prayer.
To begin with, the practice of legislative prayer, which seems at first blush like
an inappropriate entanglement of Church and State, is the main focus of Nicholas
Roberts in his article claiming that with the rise of the Religious None, soon comes
the end to such practice.127 It is Roberts’ position that Marsh v. Chambers128 and
Town of Greece v. Galloway 129 were both wrongly decided, and that legislative prayer
will “almost certainly be ruled unconstitutional eventually.” 130 It has only survived
this long, he posits, “because the American people have been willing to accept the
practice. However, the public’s acquiescence will not last forever, especially
considering that the number of . . . [Nones] is growing.” 131
Roberts, in applying his strategic model, shows that public opinion may influence the
next decision the Supreme Court makes by threat of overruling the Court’s decision
by via the public’s access to the legislative process and, specifically, to congressional
legislation.132 Because each “succeeding generation of new Americans [is] less
religious than the one before it,” it is only a matter of time before the practice of
legislative prayer is successfully challenged.133 “Americans become more secular and
125
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less attached to religion, they will likely also grow less tolerant of the Court’s
preference for monotheistic religions—and Christianity in particular—over all
others. Such a shift would remove the institutional pressures that have forced the
Court to uphold legislative prayer until now.”134 According to Roberts, all that is
required for political or legal change to occur is not for a majority of American to
become Nones or for Christians to become a minority, but merely that a majority of
Americans “become sympathetic to the cause.”135
Essentially, if the Nones continue to grow in population and if sympathy is the
only requirement for change, America may be due for continued changes, such as the
removal of legislative prayer or military chaplains. What remains as a further
question is how the increased frequency of Nones will implicate religious liberties.
For example, with a majority of Americans believing that business owners should not
be able to discriminate based on sexual orientation for service based upon religious
ideology, is this practice ripe for change? Secondly, will the religious doctor be denied
the ability claim the status of conscientious objector to refuse providing certain kinds
of medical care that that doctor finds contradictory to her own religious morals? These
questions, while beyond the scope of this Note, will become more important as time
moves on.
CONCLUSION
Some commentators believe that the rise of the Religious Nones and their
secularization of law and politics is a prediction for strain on American religious
liberty,136 or even the end of religion itself.137 Others disagree, providing arguments
for the ongoing necessity of religion and the special importance of protecting the
status of religion and religious liberty in the United States.138 Rabbi Eric Yoffie holds
that while there is ongoing skepticism, “[c]hurch and synagogue will not be
abandoned but reconfigured. Religious authority will not be discarded but rethought.
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And a restless, changing America will, yet again, create a synthesis between religious
tradition and modernity that will reshape our religious institutions.” 139
Regardless, when it comes to politics and law governing matters and issues
that are based solely on the premise of traditional Judeo-Christian beliefs, the Nones
should be identified as a causative element of change—one towards the secularization
of laws that have no foundation except for that of religion. If Roberts is to be believed,
the only requirement for change in politics or law is that a majority of Americans
“become sympathetic to the law.”140 With no reason to believe that the growth of the
Nones will slow, it is possible that the socio-political and legal landscapes of the near
future will be far more secularized, or without religious-based morality, at least, than
what we see today.
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